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WEAK-FORM JUDICIAL REVIEW AND AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM
ROSALIND DIXON*
Recent Commonwealth rights charters, various scholars have
argued, represent a new “weaker” model of constitutional rights protection
than the U.S. constitutional model: unlike the U.S. Bill of Rights, they give
legislatures broad formal power to override rights, and therefore also court
decisions. The article argues, however, that in practice such powers have
rarely if ever been used by Commonwealth legislatures, and therefore, that
if judicial review is in fact weaker in Commonwealth countries, compared
to the U.S., it is only because Commonwealth courts have been more willing
than the U.S. Supreme Court to uphold ordinary legislative attempts to
override court decisions. While this may be connected to the greater
availability of a formal power of legislative override in the Commonwealth,
it also far from given response by Commonwealth courts to the existence of
such powers. This more limited – and contingent – view of the difference
between Commonwealth and U.S. constitutionalism in this context also has
clear practical implications for processes of constitutional “borrowing”
across countries.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, comparative constitutional scholars have noted the
rise in countries such as Canada, New Zealand, the UK and Australia (at a
state level) of what they describe as a new, distinctive model of judicial
review in which courts have broad authority to interpret constitutional rights
provisions, but national legislatures can override courts’ interpretations of
rights by ordinary majority vote.1 Mark Tushnet has labeled this the rise of
a new “weak-form” model of judicial review; while Stephen Gardbaum has
labeled it a “new model of Commonwealth constitutionalism”.2
In describing this new model of judicial review, most scholars
suggest that it can be directly contrasted, within the Anglo-American world,
with the model of “strong-form” review that prevails in the U.S. The key
*Assistant Professor, University of Chicago Law School. Thanks to Stephen
Gardbaum, Jake Gersen, Todd Henderson, Anup Malani, Lior Strahilevitz and David
Strauss for helpful comments on previous drafts of this paper.
1
Rosalind Dixon, A Democratic Theory of Constitutional Comparison, 56 AM. J.
COMP. L. 947 (2008); Rosalind Dixon, Partial Constitutional Amendments, U. PA. J.
CONST. L. (forthcoming 2010); MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS:
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SOCIAL WELFARE RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(2008).
2
Id.
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reason for this, these scholars argue, is that in the relevant Commonwealth
countries legislatures retain formal authority to override court decisions by
ordinary majority vote.3 In the U.S., of course, neither Congress nor state
legislatures has this authority under either Art V, Art III or §5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.4
The key benefit to this weakening in the finality of judicial review,
compared to in the U.S., is said to be that it helps “transfor[m]
constitutional rights discourse from a judicial monologue into a richer and
more balanced inter-institutional dialogue” thereby “reducing, if not
eliminating, the tension between judicial protection of fundamental rights
and democratic decisionmaking”.5
This article, however, re-examines this claim of CommonwealthU.S. difference, and argues that is in fact far more limited and nuanced than
the existing literature implies. To date, the article shows, the relevant
Commonwealth legislatures have made almost no actual use of their formal
powers of legislative override in respect of court decisions. To date,
therefore, there has been no direct constraint on Commonwealth, as
compared to U.S., courts when it comes to the finality – or strength – of
their decisions.
This does not necessarily mean that the attempt to create a weakform of judicial review in Commonwealth countries has failed. In a number
of cases, Commonwealth legislatures have attempted to use ordinary
legislative means in order to override aspects of court decisions, and in most
cases, have succeeded in doing so. One reason for this is the relatively low
rate at which such “dialogic legislative sequels” have been actively
reconsidered by courts in countries such as the UK and Canada. Another
reason is that, in Canada in particular, courts have consistently deferred to
dialogic legislative sequels, whereas in the U.S., the Supreme Court has
tended to take a far more uneven approach to assessing the constitutionality
of such sequels.6
There are also two quite logical explanations for this pattern of
increased deference in a country such as Canada, as compared to the U.S.:
3

Id.
For a differing view of section 5, see e.g., Robert C. Post and Reva B. Siegel,
Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the
Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L. J. 1943 (2003).
5
See Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Constitutionalism, 49 AM. J.
COMP. L. 707, 745 (2001). Garbaum, like others, also notes the potential advantages of the
model in addressing democratic “debilitation” and in enhancing courts’ legitimacy.
Compare JANET HIEBERT, CHARTER CONFLICTS: WHAT IS PARLIAMENT’S ROLE? (2001)
(Hereinafter HIEBERT, CHARTER CONFLICTS).
6
Rosalind Dixon, The Supreme Court of Canada, Charter Dialogue, and Deference,
47 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 235 (2009) (Hereinafter Charter Dialogue)
4
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one, that a broad power of formal override creates greater pressure on
judges to defer to dialogic legislative sequels; and second, that it provides
courts with additional legal authorization for showing such deference.
At the same time, the article suggests, it is also important not to
overstate the strength of any such indirect connection between a formal
power of override and judicial deference to dialogic legislative sequels. No
Commonwealth court has explicitly endorsed the existence of such a
connection, and thus, Commonwealth courts could quite easily decide in the
future to adopt a different understanding of the significance of a potential
legislative override. If they did so, given the political costs involved for
legislatures, there would also be no guarantee that Commonwealth
legislatures would increase their actual use of a formal override power.
This more limited – and contingent – view of the difference between
Commonwealth and U.S. constitutionalism also has potential practical
consequences. In the U.S., it draws attention to the range of ways in which
constitutional actors could potentially learn from Commonwealth
experience, assuming they wished to create a weaker model of judicial
review, domestically. In other countries, such as Australia, it also helps
clarify the complex nature of attempts to “borrow” from other
Commonwealth, as compared to U.S., constitutional models in the design of
a possible future national rights charter.
The article is divided into four parts. Part I.A briefly sets out the
existing literature and orthodoxy on weak-form judicial review as a distinct
constitutional model, opposed to the model that operates in the U.S., that
allow legislatures broad scope to override court decisions with which they
disagree. Part I.B then examines the actual record to date of weak-form
review in Canada, the UK, New Zealand, Australia (at a state level), and
shows how in those countries, there has been no actual greater use of formal
mechanisms of legislative override than in the U.S. Part II explores the
possibility that a weaker form of judicial review has nonetheless been
created in some of these countries, relative to the U.S., by reason of more
consistent deference, by courts, to legislative attempts at override via more
ordinary, informal means. Part III also considers the potential connection
between this pattern and the availability of a formal power of legislative
override in the two sets of countries. Part IV concludes by exploring the
potential practical implications of this form of constitutional commonality
for forms of constitutional learning or “borrowing” by constitutional
decision-makers in these various countries, including the U.S and Australia.

4
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I.

THE NEW COMMONWEALTH CONSTITUTIONAL MODEL AND ACTUAL
LEGISLATIVE OVERRIDE

A.

Formal Powers of Override

In identifying the new Commonwealth model of rights protection,
scholars such as Stephen Gardbaum generally point to five constitutional or
quasi-constitutional rights charters: the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms 1982; the New Zealand Bill of Rights 1990 (NZBOR); the UK
Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA), and the two state-level charters in
Australia, the ACT Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT HRA) and Victorian
Charter of Rights and Responsibilities 2006 (Victorian Charter). The
defining feature of these charters, Gardbaum suggests, is that they all
preserve “formal legislative power to have the final word on what the law of
the land is by ordinary majority vote”.7
In Canada, the key provision that ensures this is s. 33 of the
Canadian Charter, or the so-called “notwithstanding clause”.8 Section 33(1)
provides that the Canadian “Parliament or the legislature of a province may
expressly declare in an Act of Parliament or of the legislature…that the Act
or a provision thereof shall operate notwithstanding a provision included in
section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of [the] Charter”. Such a declaration may be
passed by ordinary majority vote and has the effect that, for a five-year
renewable period, the legislation in question operates “as it would have” but
for the relevant provisions of the Charter. It can also be used retrospectively
as well as prospectively.9
In New Zealand, the UK and Australia, a similar source of override
power derives from the fact that legislatures may either expressly or
impliedly repeal the operation of rights norms, by ordinary majority vote.
The NZBOR, HRA and Australian state charter were all enacted as ordinary
7

Gardbaum, supra note 5 at 707. Tushnet likewise suggests that strong-form review
only really exists, or at least raises democratic difficulties, “in systems where constitutional
amendment is significantly more difficult than is the enactment of ordinary legislation”:
Mark Tushnet, The Rise of Weak-Form Judicial Review, in THE RESEARCH HANDBOOK IN
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 5 (Rosalind Dixon and Tom Ginsburg, eds.,
forthcoming 2011); see also id at 4 (The ease or difficulty of amending a constitution
should affect the choice between strong-form and weak-form constitutional review. One
could also argue that these charters constitute a distinct model of constitutional rights
protection in that, in contrast to the position in many newer democracies and civil law
countries, the reason they adopt such a power of legislative override is on order to address
the potential democratic or “counter-majoritarian” difficulty associated with the practice of
judicial review by ordinary judges (rather than political and academic leaders) in a stable
two-party democracy – rather than for other reasons).
8
Amendment is more onerous. Compare Gardbaum, supra note 5 at 723.
9
Ford v. Canada, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712
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statutes, and such a power of repeal is a traditional incident of the doctrine
of parliamentary sovereignty.10 Such a power is also expressly confirmed,
in Victoria, by the provision in s. 31 of the Charter that “[p]arliament may
expressly declare in an Act that that Act …has effect despite being
incompatible with one or more of the human rights”; and in all three
contexts by express limitations on the power of courts to invalidate laws for
inconsistency with protected.
In the UK, s. 4 of the HRA provides that where it is not possible for
a court to “read and giv[e] effect” to legislation “in a way which is
compatible with the Convention rights”, a court may make a “declaration of
incompatibility.” Such a declaration, however, does not “affect the validity,
continuing operation or enforcement of the provision in respect of which it
is given, and is not binding on the parties to the proceedings in which it is
made.”11 Similarly, in New Zealand, the New Zealand Court of Appeal has
found that this is the logical effect of the combined provision in the NZBOR
that rights recognized by the BOR “may be subject only to such reasonable
limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society”, but also that no court could “[h]old any provision” of
another statute “to be impliedly repealed or revoked, or to be in any way
invalid or ineffective” by reason of the BOR.12 Parallel provisions,
regarding the making of a declaration of incompatibility, are also found in s
32 of the ACT HRA and s 28 of the Victorian Charter.13 In each case, the
net effect is that the legislature has power to suspend the effect of courts’
interpretation of particular rights, simply by the use of sufficiently clear
language. In the Victorian Charter, this power is also expressly confirmed
by the provision in s. 31 of the Charter that “Parliament may expressly
declare in an Act that that Act …has effect despite being incompatible with
one or more of the human rights”.
A second source of override power, in the UK, New Zealand and
under Australian state charters, is the power legislatures have to amend the
scope of written rights guarantees. Except in Australia, legislatures in these
jurisdictions have a general power to amend all constitutional norms, by
ordinary majority vote.14 Because the HRA and NZBOR and Australian
10

See e.g., Julie Taylor, Human Rights Protection in Australia: Interpretation
Provisions and Parliamentary Supremacy, 32 FED. L. REV. 57 (2004). For a different view
of the power of these parliaments, and particularly the Westminster Parliament, to rely on a
power of implied as opposed to express repeal, compare Gardbaum, supra note 5 at 73536.
11
Human Rights Act (HRA) s. 4(6).
12
Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review, [2000] 2 NZLR 9.
13
Id.
14
On the federalism difference in Australia, see Chief Justice Murray Gleeson AC,
Chief Justice of Australia, Boyer Lecture Series, Aspects of the Commonwealth

6

Weak-Form Review and American Exceptionalism

state charters were all enacted by way of ordinary statute, this power also
extends with equal force, at least as a matter of domestic law, to the
substantive provisions of the HRA, NZBOR and Australian state charters.
In the UK, a third, more indirect source of override power is also the
power of the executive to derogate from various provisions of the European
Convention, which are otherwise incorporated by s. 1 of the HRA.15
Derogations of this kind must comply with the requirements of Art 15(1) of
the Convention, which require that derogations be made only “[i]n time of
war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation” and only
“to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation”, and
cannot be made in respect of certain rights. However, they may be made
retrospectively, as well as prospectively, and thus give the legislative
majority in a parliamentary system another broad source of potential
override power.
These formal features of the new Commonwealth rights charters
also stand in quite clear contrast to parallel features of the U.S. Constitution,
such as Art V, Art III and §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.16 Because of
this, scholars such as Gardbaum suggest, when compared to new
Commonwealth constitutional models the U.S. is widely understood as “the
paradigmatic regime of judicial supremacy”.17
When it comes to constitutional amendment in the U.S., for
example, Art V provides that for an amendment to the Constitution to
succeed, it must obtain the support of both two thirds of the House and
Senate and also the legislature (or a convention) in three quarters of the
states.18 This makes any override of the Supreme Court by formal
constitutional amendment extremely difficult–in fact, on one measure, more
difficult than in any other country in the world.19
Art III, in turn, confers both broad power on U.S. courts to
invalidate legislation for inconsistency with the Constitution,20 and limited
power on Congress to override such decisions by removing cases from the
Constitution – Part One, Transcript available at:
http://www.abc.net.au/rn/boyerlectures/stories/2000/219789.htm.
15
HRA, ss. 1(2), 14.
16
Gardbaum, supra note 5; TUSHNET, supra note 1; Geoffrey Marshall, Taking Rights
for an Override, Free Speech and Commercial Expression, PUB. L. 4, 11 (1989).
17
Stephen Gardbaum, Reassessing the New Commonwealth Model of
Constitutionalism (Working Paper 2010) (available online at:
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/Gardbaum%204%208%2010.pdf ) *5.
18
There is, of course, also the possibility for amendments to be proposed by
convention, but this method has never been used: see note 19 infra.
19
Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment. in RESPONDING TO
IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 237
(Sanford Levinson, ed. 1995)
20
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
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jurisdiction of the courts.21 While the outer bounds on Congress’ power
under Art III remain somewhat uncertain, existing Supreme Court decisions
in this area suggest that the Court will hesitate to recognize a power on the
part of Congress to deprive all courts of jurisdiction over constitutional
controversies.22 Without a comprehensive power of this kind, it will also be
extremely difficult for Congress effectively to override a decision of the
Court by means of Art III, because lower courts will continue to be bound
by the Court’s prior decisions in exercising their ongoing jurisdiction in a
particular area.
Some scholars also point to §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
the power Congress has “to enforce, by appropriate legislation” the
substantive provisions of the Amendment, as an additional source of
potential override power. On this view, the power to enforce includes the
power to prefer a different interpretation of the Amendment than that
favored by the Court.23 The Supreme Court, however, has explicitly rejected
this argument, holding that Congress does “not enforce a constitutional right
by changing what the right is”. Rather, the Court has held, for any use by
Congress of its power under §5 to be given effect by the Court, it must be
“congruent and proportional” to remedying or preventing a constitutional
injury as defined by the Court itself.24
B.

The Actual Record of Legislative Override to Date

In order to be meaningful, however, this characterization of the new
Commonwealth model of judicial review as distinctly weaker than the U.S.
model must to some degree be supported by the actual record of legislative
override in countries such as Canada, New Zealand, the UK and Australia.
Without this, as scholars such as Gardbaum and Tushnet themselves
note, there can be no suggestion that the model of judicial review in these
countries represents a new way of “balanc[ing] or reconcil[ing]” the
perceived tension between individual rights protection by courts and
21

Compare Gardbaum , supra note 5 at 752 (noting the logical possibility that it might
offer an avenue for legislative override).
22
See e.g., Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. 236 (1845) (upholding the preclusion of all forms of
post-deprivation relief in a judicial setting against the Collector of Customs, but
emphasizing the importance in this context of the existence of a pre-deprivation remedy);
Battaglia v. Gen Motors Corp., 169 F. 2d 254 (2d Cir. 1948) (suggesting that Congress
cannot invoke its power under Art III to deny any and all judicial remedies for a past
constitutional violation [as defined by the Court]). For further discussion see generally
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. AND JOHN F. MANNING, ET AL. HART AND WECHSLER’S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, 6th ed. 300-12 (2009).
23
See Post and Siegel, supra note 4.
24
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)
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democratic self-government which, as Gardbaum notes, “[i]s often thought
to create the counter-majoritarian difficulty”.25 Instead, given the
willingness of Commonwealth courts actively to enforce such rights-based
commitments,26 the form these Commonwealth constitutions take will be
little more than a formal, historical curiosity, related to these countries’ long
history of parliamentary sovereignty.27
While comparative constitutional scholars have made a number of
attempts to assess the pattern of actual legislative response to court
decisions in these countries, for the most part they have also failed directly
to address this question. Instead, they have focused on the rate at which
legislatures formally repeal, amend or re-enact legislation in response to
courts decisions, 28 when all of these responses can potentially be consistent
with a decision by the both to comply with and override a court.29
If one focuses on the specific question of legislative override, it also
turns out that there have been relatively few instances to date under the new
Commonwealth constitutions in which legislatures have sought to override
courts; and almost none in which they have done so by use of a formal
power of override.
In New Zealand, between 1990 and 2005 there were only 13 cases in
which New Zealand courts found some form of inconsistency between the
NZBOR and specific legislation,30 and in only one of these, Refugee
Council of New Zealand Inc v. Attorney-General,31 was the response of the
New Zealand Parliament to attempt to override even part of the effect of a
court decision. After a subsequent successful appeal by the New Zealand
government, this was also a case in which the New Zealand courts
25

Gardbaum, supra note 5 at 709.
See Gardbaum, supra note 17; Sujit Choudry and Claire E. Hunter, Measuring
Judicial Activism on the Supreme Court of Canada: A Comment on Newfoundland
(Treasury Board) v.NAPE, 48 MCGILL L..J. 525 (2003)
27
On the historical role played by notions of parliamentary sovereignty, see e.g.,
Roger Tassé and Louis Tassé, Application de la Charte canadienne des droits de liberté, in
THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS (Gérald-A Beaudoin and Errole
Mendes eds, 3d ed. 1996).
28
The most famous example of this is a study by Peter Hogg and Alison Bushell (now
Thornton) of the rate of legislative response to decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada
(SCC) invalidating legislation for inconsistency with the Canadian Charter, which found a
response rate of approximately eighty per cent: see Peter W. Hogg and Allison A. Bushell,
The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps The Charter of
Rights Isn’t Such a Bad Thing After All), 35 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 75, 96-8 (1997)
29
For similar arguments, and an early attempt to address this deficit in the literature,
see Christopher P. Manfredi and James Kelly, Six Degrees of Dialogue: A Response to
Hogg and Bushell 37 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 513, 521 (1999).
30
The relevant cut-off date I used was the end of 2004. This time-frame was designed
in large part to allow for the possibility of legislative delay in response to court decisions.
31
[2002] NZAR 769.
26
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themselves narrowed their interpretation of the right at stake, so that there
was little ultimate conflict between the courts and parliament. Out of the
remaining 12 cases, there were two instances where Parliament responded
with a highly “compliant” form of legislative amendment;32 and 10 where
Parliament did not respond in any way, and thus simply deferred to courts’
existing interpretation of a statute based on the NZBOR.33 During this
period, therefore, there was no instance in which Parliament sought, either
by way of amendment, express or implied repeal or non-implementation, to
make use of its formal power of legislative override.
In the UK, between 1999 and 2004, there were 18 cases in which
English courts relied on either s. 3 or s. 4 of the HRA in order to identify a
prima facie incompatibility between legislation and Convention rights and
that finding was upheld on appeal. Out of these 18 cases, there were two
cases involving s. 4 (i.e. International Transport Roth GmbH v. Secretary of
State for the 2Home Department34 and R (Anderson) v. Secretary of State
for the Home Department,35) and one involving s. 3 (R v. A (No 2)) where
Westminster responded by seeking to override any part of the court’s
interpretation of the Convention. In none of these three cases, however, did
the Parliament place any direct reliance on its formal powers of legislative
override.36 Instead, it chose simply to rely on ordinary legislative
mechanisms in order to enact the relevant legislative sequels.
Out the remaining eight cases involving s. 4 in the UK, in five cases
Westminster responded by passing legislative amendments or delegated
“remedial orders” directly removing the incompatibility identified by the
courts,37 and in another case, by adopting legislative changes that went well
32

Knight v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue, [1991] 2 N.Z.L.R. 30; Ministry of
Transport v. Noort, [1992] 3 NZLR 260; Police v. Curran [1992] 3 N.Z.L.R. 260
33
R v. Rangi [1992] 1 N.Z.L.R. 385; Television New Zealand Ltd v. Attorney-General
[1995] 2 N.Z.L.R. 641 (NZ CA); B v. M [1997] 3 N.Z.L.R. 202 (NZHC); Police v.
Wellington Newspapers Ltd. [1998] DCR 440 (NZ DC, Wellington); Mnikam v. Chief
Executive Department of Labour, [1999] NZAR 542 (NZ HC); Newspapers Publishers
Association of New Zealand (Inc) v. Family Court, [1999] 2 N.Z.L.R. 344 (NZHC); Ngati
Apa Ki Te Waipounamu Trust v. R, [2000] 2 N.Z.L.R. 659 (NZCA); Police v. Beggs,
[1999] 3 N.Z.L.R. 615 (HC, FC); Hopkinson v. Police, [2004] 3 N.Z.L.R. 704 (NZ HC);
Moonen v. Film and Literature Board of Review, [2000] 2 N.Z.L.R. 9 (NZ CA).
34
[2003] QB 728.
35
[2003] 1 AC 837.
36
The only explicit use of such a power has made has been the decision by the British
government formally to derogate from its obligations under Art 5(3) of the European
Convention following 9/11, and this was in no way a direct response to particular court
decisions under Art 5.
37
See R. (H.) v. London North and East Region Mental Health Review Tribunal,
[2002] EWCA Civ 92; R v. McR, [2002] NIQB 58; R (D) v. Secretary of State for the
Home Department, [2003] 1 W.L.R. 1315 (Eng. CA); Blood and Tarbuck v. Secretary of
State for Health English, [2003] EWHC; and R (on the application of M) v. Secretary of
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beyond those required by the House of Lords itself. 38 In the remaining case,
the reason Parliament did not respond to the Court of Appeal’s decision was
also far from dialogic: it had, in the relevant case, already removed the
infringing tax deduction prospectively,39 and there would have distinct
potential rights-based objections to any law seeking retrospectively to
remove the relevant deduction.40 As to cases under s. 3 of the HRA, six out
of the remaining eight cases were met with legislative silence,41 or reenactment of the same legislative provisions in un-amended form,42 which,
in the context of s. 3, amounted to a decision by Parliament simply to defer
to the court’s resolution of the particular question. In the two other cases,
Parliament further responded either by passing broad legislative change,
beyond that required by the decision of the courts themselves,43 or by
removing the precise incompatibility identified by the courts.44
In Australia, there are still relatively few cases “first look” cases
involving the application of either the ACT HRA or Victorian Charter by
superior courts. In the ACT, the ACT Supreme Court is yet to issue even
one declaration of incompatibility under s. 32 of the ACT HRA;45 and has
relied on its power of reading down under the charter on only four separate
occasions.46 In Victoria, the Supreme Court of Victoria and Victorian Court
of Appeal have issued only one ‘declaration of inconsistent interpretation’
State for Health [2003] A.C.D 389; [2003] EWHC 1094 (HC Admin Div) and Mental
Capacity Act 2004.
38
Bellinger v. Bellinger, [2003] 2 A.C. 467 (HL)
39
See R (Wilkinson) v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, [2003] 1 W.L.R. 2683 (Eng.
CA) and Finance Act 1999. s. 34 (abolishing relevant deduction found to be in breach of
Arts 8 and 14, for all deaths occurring after April 6, 2000).
40
See discussion in Rosalind Dixon, A Minimalist Charter of Rights for Australia: The
UK or Canada as a Model." 37 FED. L. REV. 335 (2009).
41
Cachia v. Faluyi, [2001] 1 W.L.R. 1966 (Eng. CA); R v. Lambert [2001] UKHL 37
(HL); R v. Carass, [2002] 1 W.L.R. 1714 (Eng. CA); R (Middleton) v Her Majesty's
Coroner for the Western District of Somerset, [2004] 2 W.L.R. 800; Attorney General's
Reference No. 4 of 2002, [2004] UKHL 43.
42
See R (Sim) v. Parole Board, [2003] 1 W.L.R. 1374 and Criminal Justice Act 2003
s. 247(3)).
43
See Ghaidan v. Godin- Mendoza (FC) [2004] UKHL 30 (HL) and Civil Partnerships
Act 2004.
44
R v Offen [2001] 1 W.L.R. 25 and Criminal Justice Act 2003, s. 225
45
Another case in which the Court suggested the possibility that such a declaration
might be required, but did not ultimately reach the issue, was Pappas v. Noble, [2006]
ACTSC 39.
46
See e.g., In the matter of an application for bail by Richard Donald Breen, [2009]
ACTSC 172; Richard John Travini v. Wojtek Starczewski, [2009] ACTSC 123; Re An
Application for Bail by Chris Merritt, [2009] ACTSC 56 and R v. Kristiansen, [2008]
ACTSC 83 (both considering the same provisions of 43 of Bail Act 1992 (ACT)); and SI
bhnf CC v KS bhnf IS, (SI bhnf) (2005) 34 Fam LR 468.
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under s. 36 of the Victorian Charter,47 and one decision involving direct
reliance on its power of reading down under s. 32 of the Charter.48 While a
legislative response may still eventuate in some of these cases, to date there
has also been only one legislative response arising from these cases.49 The
response in question was also fully compliant with the ACT Supreme
Court’s insistence, in SI bhnf, that judges should retain discretion to refuse
to make a final, as opposed to interim, protection order in domestic violence
cases.50
In Canada, there have been a much larger number of cases in which
the SCC has struck down legislation for inconsistency with the Charter:
between 1982 and the end of 2004, for example, there were 54 cases in this
category. Out of these, 14 were also followed by an attempt by the
Canadian Parliament or a provincial legislature to override at least part of
the SCC’s decision. Even in this context, however, there has been almost
no use by the legislature of a formal power of legislative override – because
out of these 14 cases of legislative dialogue, only one involved the actual
use of s. 33.
In this case, Ford v. Québec (A.G),51 the SCC invalidated certain
provisions of Québec Charter of the French Language prohibiting the use
of English on public signs, and the Québec legislature responded by reenacting the same provisions by reliance on s. 33 of the Charter.52 Even this
use of a formal power of override, however, was quite short-lived, because
after a five year period, the Québec legislature amended the relevant law to
allow bilingual signage, providing French was the ‘present and
predominant’ language used. This was also exactly the approach advocated
by the SCC itself in Ford, as the most appropriate way to balance
competing constitutional interests at in this area.53 Beyond this, s. 33 of the
Charter has been used only 15 times in Canada, and each of these instances
47

See R v. Momcilovic, [2010] VSCA 50 (17 March 2010) (making declaration in
respect of reverse burden of proof in s 5 of the Drugs, Poisons and Controlled Substances
Act 1981 (Vic) (‘DPCS Act’))
48
Re an application under the Major Crime (Investigative Powers) Act 2004, [2009]
VSC 381. For a case in which one member of the Court of Appeal would have relied on s.
32, see also RJE v. Secretary to the Department of Justice, [2008] VSCA 131 (18
December 2008).
49
It often takes some time for legislatures to respond to court decisions, and several of
these cases are very recent. Compare e.g., Manfredi and Kelly, supra note 29, on this issue
in the Canadian context.
50
Domestic Violence and Protection Orders Act 2008, Pt VI.
51
[1988] 2 S.C.R. 712,
52
An Act to Amend the Charter of the French Language, S.Q. 1988, c. 54, s. 10 (“Bill
178”))
53
An Act to Amend the Charter of the French Language, S.Q. 1993, c. 40, s. 18.
Compare Ford, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712 at par. 73.
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has involved an attempt by a provincial legislature prospectively to suspend
the operation of particular rights – rather than directly to override any
particular court decision.54
Thus far, therefore, Commonwealth legislatures have used their
formal powers of override in response to specific court decisions on only
one occasion since new Commonwealth constitutions were enacted. In
Canada in particular, this also implies a rate of formal override roughly
equivalent to that in the U.S. in the first hundred years of the Constitution’s
existence.55
This low rate of formal override in Commonwealth countries is also
not simply the product, I have suggested elsewhere, of greater public
disagreement with court decisions.56 Certainly, no Commonwealth decision
has been as controversial as decisions of the Supreme Court such as
Lochner v. New York¸57 or Roe v. Wade,58 but many Commonwealth
decisions have still attracted significant controversy.
In the UK, for example, in the criminal justice context there has
been strong public support in recent years for a “law and order” agenda,59
yet also numerous cases under the HRA in which English courts have given
a broad reading to the rights of criminal defendants.60 In Canada, there
54

See Tsvi Kahana, The Notwithstanding Mechanism and Public Discussion: Lessons
from the Ignored Practice of Section 33 of the Charter, 44 CAN. PUB. ADMIN. J. 255
(2001).
55
From 1789 to 1895, Congress and state legislatures used Art V three times – or
roughly every thirty five years on average – to override the decisions of the Supreme Court
in Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793); Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857); and
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895). In Canada, by comparison,
there has been one formal override in roughly 30 years. (The one other instance of such
formal override by Art V in the U.S. occurred in 1971 in response to Oregon v. Mitchell,
400 U.S. 112 (1970)).
56
See e.g., Dixon, Charter Dialogue, supra note 6.
57
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
58
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
59
See John Darnton, British Labor Party Sheds Marx for Middle Class, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 5, 1994) (detailing future Prime Minister Tony Blair’s law and order priorities at time
of assuming leadership of British Labor); The Blair Story, BBC.Com, May 10, 2007, online
at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/uk_politics/2007/blair_years/default.stm (on the
broad priorities of the Blair government, and legislative majority, from 1997-2007).
60
See e.g., Anderson (issuing a declaration of incompatibility in respect of certain
provisions of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 conferring discretion on the Home Secretary
to decline to release persons serving a life sentence on parole); R v. A (No2) (“reading
down” apparently codified rape-shield provisions so as to create a residual discretion on the
part of trial judges to admit any potentially exculpatory evidence); Offen (narrowing the
range of cases in which an automatic life sentence would apply, by reading the
“exceptional circumstances” necessary to avoid such a result very broadly, as referring to
all cases in which a person did not pose a “significant risk to members of the public”); Sim
(narrowing the circumstances in which a prisoner recalled from release on license could be
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have also been several cases, in addition to Ford, where there has been
strong public opposition to decisions of the SCC. R. v. Seaboyer,61 for
example, was a case in which the SCC struck down certain “rape-shield”
laws under the Criminal Code, which met with very strong opposition from
both women’s groups, and the Canadian public at large.62 RJR-MacDonald
Inc. v. Canada (A.G.),63 in which the SCC struck down certain restrictions
on tobacco advertising, was also another case that was met with extremely
broad public disapproval.64
II.

THE NEW COMMONWEALTH CONSTITUTIONAL MODEL AND JUDICIAL
DEFERENCE

A.

Judicial Deference and Legislative Dialogic Success in Canada

This does not mean that Commonwealth legislatures have
necessarily failed in their attempt to override court decisions other than in
this one case, or that there is no difference between the strength of judicial
review in Commonwealth countries and the U.S.65
On the contrary, there is good evidence that, in Canada in particular,
legislatures have had a high rate of success in enacting partial forms of
override, by ordinary legislative means.66 It is simply that the reason for
this has not been the existence of any direct legal constraint on courts – but
rather a more voluntary decision by courts both to avoid consideration of
and actively defer to dialogic legislative sequels.
In both Canada and the UK, there has been a relative scarcity of
“second look” cases involving a challenge to legislative attempts at override
(or dialogue). In the UK, there has in fact been no direct judicial challenge
heard to date involving the legislative sequel to cases such as Roth,
Anderson and R v. A (No 2).
held in custody, by “reading-down” the apparent presumption in favor of continued
detention, so as to create a presumption in favor of release).
61
[1991] 2 S.C.R 577 [Seaboyer].
62
See HIEBERT, CHARTER CONFLICTS, supra note 5at 85, 93..
63
[1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 [RJR-MacDonald].
64
For arguments to this effect, see e.g., HIEBERT, CHARTER CONFLICTS, supra note 5
at 80-82.
65
Tushnet raises the possibility that there is in fact no meaningful difference, given the
tendency of weak-form systems of judicial review to converge toward either strong-form
review, or legislative supremacy: compare Mark Tushnet, Alternative Forms of Judicial
Review, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2782 (2003); TUSHNET, supra note 1.
66
Contrast Gardbaum, supra note 5 at 727 (suggesting that, given the pattern of nonuse of s. 33, “it seems fair to say that the Canadian experience has probably done little to
undermine Marshall’s claim that no possible middle ground [between legislative and
parliamentary supremacy] exists”).
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In Canada, 9 out of the 14 cases involving an attempt at (partial)
legislative override of a SCC decision;67 and 3 out of 9 the nine cases
involving an attempt at legislative override of a provincial court decision,68
are also yet to attract any subsequent judicial consideration. And while in
some cases, this has been the product of pure accident, or a costs-rule that
requires losing parties to bear the winner’s legal costs, in others, it has been
the clear product of a strategy of avoidance on the part of the SCC in
relation to second look cases.69
Take Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Canadian Liberty
70
Net, in which the SCC was asked to consider the validity of antidiscrimination legislation targeting the transmission of “hate messages”.71
This legislation had been enacted by the Canadian Parliament in response to
an earlier decision of the SCC, in R v. Zundel, striking down the prohibition
in the Criminal Code against “willfully publishing false news”. The Court
in Zundel had held that, given parallel prohibitions on the willful incitement
of racial hatred upheld by the Court in R v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R 697,
such a prohibition was an unjustified infringement of the right to freedom of
expression in s. 2(b) of the Charter. Parliament, however, had clearly
disagreed. While repealing criminal penalties for non-intentional forms of
hate speech, it had also introduced substantial civil penalties for such
speech, under the relevant provisions of the anti-discrimination code. In
Liberty Net, the SCC was also being asked to consider the validity of such a
dialogic legislative sequel, in the same year in which it was enacted. The
response of the SCC was simply to defer the constitutional question, by
considering only the issue of whether the lower court in the case had
jurisdiction to issue an injunctive order of the kind it made.72
In Canada in particular, another important factor in the success of
ordinary forms of legislative override has been the willingness of the SCC –

67

See e.g., the legislative responses to Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada v.
Canada, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 139; R. v. Bain, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 91; R. v. Daviault, [1994] 3
S.C.R. 63; Thomson Newspapers v. Canada (Attorney General), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 877;
Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 203; R. v.
Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45; Figueroa v. Canada (A.G.), [2003] 1 S.C.R. 912 and R. v.
Zundel, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731.
68
See e.g., the responses to MacLean v. Nova Scotia (A.G.), (1987) 76 N.S.R. (2d)
296; R. v. Chief, (1989) 51 C.C.C. (3d) 265; and R. v. Music Explosion Ltd., (1990), 68
Man. R. (2d) 203.
69
On the concept of second look cases, see Dixon, Charter Dialogue, supra note 6.
70
Canadian (Human Rights Commission) v. Canadian Liberty Net, [1998] 1 S.C.R.
626.
71
Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S. 1985, c. H-6, ss. 13, 53, 54, as am. 1998, c. 9, ss.
27, 28.
72
Liberty Net, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 626.
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in the context of legislative sequels to decisions such as R. v. Seaboyer,73 R.
v. Swain,74 R. v. Morales,75 and RJR-MacDonald 76– actively to defer to the
legislature’s constitutional judgments at the expense of its own prior
reasoning.
In Seaboyer, the SCC initially struck down as incompatible with the
Charter certain “rape-shield” provisions of the Canadian Criminal Code,
but Parliament responded by passing what was a clear dialogic legislative
sequel: the new regime it enacted gave discretion to judges to admit
evidence of the kind considered in Seaboyer, but only where it was
“relevant, specific in nature, and [had] significant probative value which
[was] not substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice to the
administration of justice”, when the SCC in Seaboyer had strongly
emphasized the danger of Parliament preventing the admission of any
relevant and potentially exculpatory evidence.77 In R v. Darrach78, the SCC
nonetheless upheld this new law as consistent with the Charter, on the basis
that it was open to Parliament to conclude that excluding evidence of a
complainant’s sexual history furthered the “proper administration of
justice”; 79 and to “direct judges to the serious ramifications of the use of
evidence of prior sexual activity for all parties to these cases”.80 Both of
these findings were also directly inconsistent with the Court’s own prior
reasoning, in Seaboyer, about the irrelevance of particular legislative
objectives (such as increasing the willingness of complainants to report
sexual assault) and the need to give absolute priority to the accused’s right
of full answer and defense by admitting all potentially relevant and
probative evidence that did not have the potential to cause substantial
prejudice.81
In Swain, the SCC struck down various provisions of the Criminal
Code providing for the indefinite committal of persons acquitted of a crime
on grounds of insanity.82 In response, Parliament sought to give narrow
effect to the reasoning of the SCC: it preserved the system of indefinite
committal, but enacted new legislation limiting the right of the prosecution
to put the question of insanity at issue, and introducing a separate system
73

[1991] 2 S.C.R 577.
[1991] 1 S.C.R. 933.
75
[1992] 3 S.C.R. 711.
76
[1995] 3 S.C.R. 199.
77
An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (sexual assault), S.C. 1992, c 38, s. 2. (Bill C74

49).
78

[2000] 2 S.C.R. 443
R v. Darrach, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 443 at par. 41.
80
Id. at par.. 40.
81
See e.g., R. v. O’Connor, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411 at pars. 36, 53-55.
82
[1991] 1 S.C.R. 933.
79
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for administrative committal for persons found unfit to stand trial or not
guilty on grounds of mental illness.83 Despite this, in Winko,84 the SCC
upheld this new legislation almost in its entirety,85 implicitly holding that it
was open to Parliament to conclude that, as Charter values, individual
bodily security and integrity should take greater priority, over individual
liberty and security of the person, than the Court itself had suggested in
Swain.86
In Morales, the SCC held that the denial of bail “in the public
interest” constituted a denial of the right to a fair trial provided by section
11(e) of the Charter, in part because other, more specific grounds for the
denial of bail made such a provision unnecessary,87 but again Parliament
disagreed with the Court. While it repealed the particular ground for
denying bail struck down in Morales, it simultaneously introduced a new,
extremely similar ground for denying bail, based on the need “to maintain
confidence in the administration of justice”,88 which the SCC in Hall upheld
as consistent with the Charter.89 Implicitly, in doing so, it also gave clear
priority to the judgment of Parliament about the importance of this kind of
public confidence in the judicial system, relative to its own prior judgment
about the importance of protecting individual liberty and security in the
context of decisions about bail.90
Finally, in RJR-MacDonald, the precursor to JTI, the SCC held that
various provisions of Tobacco Products Control Act of 1988 prohibiting
tobacco-advertising in Canadian media and requiring mandatory,
unattributed package warnings on tobacco products constituted an
unreasonable limitation of the right to freedom of expression under the
Charter, but Parliament again responded in a dialogic manner, this time by
enacting legislation that allowed informational and brand-advertising only
in “adult-only” places and in printed matter, delivered by direct mail,
having an 85% or higher adult readership place. In Canada (A.G.) v. JTIMacdonald Corp,91 the SCC then upheld this legislation against a facial
83

Criminal Code, 1985, c. C-46, Part XX.1; An Act to Amend the Criminal Code
(mental disorder), S.C. 1991, c. 43, c. 4,
84
[1999] 2 S.C.R. 625.
85
Id. at paras. 92-93. In 2004, in R .v. Demers, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 489, the Court also
retreated from this position slightly, by holding that the new scheme was inconsistent with
s. 7 as applied to persons permanently unfit and who do not pose a significant threat to the
safety of the public.
86
See Swain, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 933; Morales, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 711 par 40-41.
87
Morales, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 711 at paras. 40-41.
88
Criminal Law Improvement Act, 1996, S.C. 1997, c. 18, s. 59.
89
Id. at paras, 40-41.
90
See Swain, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 933; Morales, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 711 par 40-41
91
[2007] 2 S.C.R. 610.
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challenge by tobacco manufacturers by a margin of 9-0.92
In some of these cases, several of the justices on the SCC also gave
quite explicit endorsement to the idea of deference to dialogic legislative
sequels, suggesting that:93
[t]o insist on slavish conformity’ by Parliament to judicial
pronouncements [regarding the meaning of the Charter] ‘would
belie the mutual respect that underpins the relationship’ between the
two institutions.
To date, there has also been only one case in which the SCC has
refused to show such deference to a dialogic legislative sequel.94 In Sauvé
I, the SCC struck down provisions of the Canada Election Act 1985 that
disqualified prison inmates from voting in federal election, on the grounds
that they constitute an unjustified limitation on the right to vote in section 3
of the Charter. While the Canadian Parliament responded by introducing
legislation which limited the disqualification of prisoners to those serving a
sentence of two years or more, in Sauvé II, the SCC struck down this
legislation based on reasoning that was even less deferential to Parliament
than that in Sauvé I.95
B.

The U.S. Record on Deference and Dialogue

In the U.S., in cases involving Constitutional as opposed to statutory
norms (or a mixture of Constitutional and statutory reasoning),96 the
Supreme Court has shown a far more uneven – or inconsistent – approach to
assessing the constitutionality of legislative attempts at override of this
kind.97
92

Id at para. 93.
See e.g., Darrach, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 443 at para. 34.
94
In Sauvé I, the SCC struck down provisions of the Canada Election Act 1985 that
disqualified prison inmates from voting in federal election as an unjustified limitation on
the right to vote in section 3 of the Charter. Parliament responded by introducing
legislation which limited the disqualification of prisoners to those serving a sentence of two
years or more, but in Sauvé II, the SCC again struck down the relevant limitation.
95
See Canada Election Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-2 (as am. by An Act to Amend the
Canada Elections Act, S.C. 1993, c. 19. s. 23(2)); Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral
Officer), [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519.
96
On the importance of “sub-constitutional” review of this kind in promoting weakform review in certain contexts in the U.S., compare e.g., Dan T. Coenen, A Constitution of
Collaboration: Protecting Fundamental Values with Second-Look Rules of Interbranch
Dialogue, 42 WM. AND MARY L. REV. 1575 (2000-2001); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE,
DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994).
97
For broader studies of the Court’s response to democratic pressures, or push-back,
see also, ROBERT DAHL, DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES: PROMISE AND
93
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A good illustration of this involves the Court’s response to various
attempts to narrow, or override, the effect of various different aspects of its
decision in Roe v. Wade,98 and also indirectly, Planned Parenthood of
Pennsylvania v. Casey.99
In Sternberg v. Carhart,100 by a vote of 6-3, struck down a Nebraska
law prohibiting all “partial birth” abortions, except those necessary to save
the life of a woman, on two separate grounds: first, that the prohibition on
D&X procedures lacked an exception for the “preservation of the health of
the mother”, as required by its decisions in Roe and Casey; and second, that
by its vague drafting, it imposed an undue burden the right, recognized in
Roe and affirmed in Casey, of women to choose a D&E abortion prior to
viability. The decision, however, was met with strong opposition in many
parts of the country;101 and Congress responded by passing the Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act of 2003, which again prohibited the knowing
performance (“in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce”) of a “partialbirth abortion”, except in order to save the life of a woman.102
In Gonzales v. Carhart,103 by a 5-to-4 vote, the Court nonetheless
upheld this attempt at dialogue,104 holding that there was insufficient
evidence that the Act created “significant health risks” to women to sustain
a facial challenge against the Act’s general prohibition on the use of D&X
procedures, post-viability.105 One reason for this was that D&E procedures
“were a commonly used and generally accepted” alternative method of lateterm abortion, which the Act clearly permitted. Another was the existence
PERFORMANCE 154-56 (1981); NEAL DEVINS AND LOUIS FISHER, THE DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION (2004); BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC
OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 354 (2009)
98
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
99
505 U.S. 833 (1992) .
100
530 U.S. 914 (2000).
101
See e.g., Julie Ray, Gallup Brain: Opinions on Partial Birth Abortion (Gallup Poll,
July 8, 2003), available at: http://www.gallup.com/poll/8791/gallup-brain-opinionspartialbirth-abortions.aspx (noting that public support for laws banning late-term abortions
have been consistently over fifty percent since Gallup began polling on the issue in 1996,
and that in three polls taken from January-October of 2000, public support in favor of such
a law ranged from 63-66%).
102
The statute referred to: the “deliberat[e] and intentiona[l] vagina[l] delivery of a
living fetus until, in the case of a head-first presentation, the entire fetal head is outside the
body of the mother, or, in the case of breech presentation, any part of the fetal trunk past
the navel is outside the body of the mother, for the purpose of performing an overt act that
the person knows will kill the partially delivered living fetus”. See Gonzales, 550 U.S. 124,
141-42.
103
550 U.S. 124 (2007).
104
550 U.S. 124, 164.
105
Id.
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of significant medical disagreement (and thus uncertainty) over the relative
safety of D&X as compared to D&E procedures, which the Court
suggested, gave Congress “wide discretion” in regulating particular
procedures.106 While the first of these reasons was entirely consistent with
Carhart I, the latter was also far less so.107 Implicitly, therefore, the Court
showed exactly the same kind of deference to ordinary attempts at
legislative override as the SCC, in cases such as Darrach, Winko and Hall.
In cases such as Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health108
and Thornburgh v. United States,109 by contrast, the Supreme Court has
taken exactly the opposite approach to attempts by state legislatures to
override aspects of Roe.
In Roe, the Court announced what were clearly a broad set of
restrictions on the government’s power to limit access to abortion during the
first and second trimesters of pregnancy, whereby the state could regulate
abortion safety only after the second trimester of pregnancy, and attempt to
promote fetal life only after the end of the second trimester (roughly, the
then point of fetal viability). Much this reasoning was also directly at odds
with the attitudes of a majority of Americans who believed that, even early
in pregnancy, abortion should be “legal only under certain
circumstances”.110 The response of state legislatures was, therefore, to pass
a series of laws seeking sharply to narrow the effect of the decision in Roe –
without necessarily calling into question its “core” holding, that (at least
prior to viability) the right to terminate a pregnancy is a fundamental right
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 111
The Court, however, repeatedly declined to defer to these dialogic
legislative sequels, over a period of at least 16 years.112 In Akron, it, first,
reaffirmed the trimester framework established in Roe, and, then, relied on
this framework to strike-down requirements relating to informed consent,
waiting periods, parental notification requirements and hospitalization
requirements for second-trimester abortions, on the basis that they were not
106

Id. at 163.
Effectively, by approaching the existence of medical uncertainty in this way, the
Court rejected a “zero tolerance” approach toward the assessment of health risks, whereas
in Carhart I it had treated the comparative health risks of various procedures as
determinative.
108
462 U.S. 416 (1983),
109
476 U.S. 747 (1986).
110
In the first Gallup poll on the question in 1975, 54% of Americans gave this answer,
as compared to only 21% who believed it should be legal in all circumstances: see Abortion
(Gallup), available at: http://www.gallup.com/poll/1576/Abortion.aspx
111
Compare Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)..
112
The first instance of at least partial deference of this kind occurred in Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
107
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“reasonably designed to further that state interest” in furthering women’s
health in the second trimester of pregnancy.113 Similarly in Thornburgh, it
“reaffirm[e] the general principles laid down in Roe and in Akron” and
applied those principled to invalidate various state counseling and reporting
requirements in respect to second-trimester abortions.
In each case, it also quite explicitly rejected the idea that it should be
prepared to engage in dialogue with state legislatures. In Akron, for
example, it emphasized that in the face of democratic opposition to the
decision in Roe, “rule of law” considerations favored reaffirming, rather
than reconsidering, Roe’s trimester framework.114 Likewise, in Thornburgh,
the Court stressed that the vitality of the principles announced in Roe
“[could not] be allowed to yield simply because of disagreement with
them”.115
Even in Casey, where the Court did finally overrule the trimester
framework set out in Roe, the Court again formally rejected the idea of
dialogue–stressing that, where public opposition to a decision means that a
decision to overrule a prior precedent could be interpreted by the public as
“surrendering to political pressure,” it was more, not less, important for the
Court to adhere to the prior decision.116
III.

JUDICIAL DEFERENCE AND FORMAL OVERRIDE POWERS

A.

A Positive Connection

It is also quite plausible that there is a connection, in this context,
between the greater willingness of the SCC, compared to the U.S. Supreme
Court, to defer to dialogic legislative sequels and the broader availability, in
Canada, of a formal power of legislative override.
Given such a power, if courts strike-down attempts at legislative
dialogue it is at least possible that legislators will respond by relying on a
formal power of override to “trump” the court’s decision.117 This will have
113

462 U.S. at 438.
Id. at 420, 428-31.
115
Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 759.
116
Id. at 867 (suggesting that where departing from the doctrine of stare decisis could
be interpreted by the public as “surrendering to political pressure,” it was more, not less,
important for the Court to adhere to the doctrine). See also NEAL DEVINS, SHAPING
CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES: ELECTED GOVERNMENT, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE
ABORTION DEBATE (1996)
117
On the trumping function of legal mechanisms, such as amendment rules, compare
Rosalind Dixon, Constitutional Amendment Rules: a Comparative Perspective, in THE
RESEARCH HANDBOOK IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Rosalind Dixon and Tom
Ginsburg, eds.) (forthcoming 2011)
114
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two potential costs for courts: it will reduce the chance that they have any
ultimate influence on a particular area of constitutional law; and also the
chance that the public perceives them as influential in shaping constitutional
meaning. Where it is used, a formal power of override almost always gives
legislators broader scope to override courts than ordinary legislation,
because, in the face of such an override, courts generally have a very clear
textual directive to change the course of common law constitutional
interpretation, and are also not constrained in doing so by prior precedent,
or the doctrine of stare decisis.118 At least where such an override is
express, rather than implied, it is also more likely to attract media and
public attention as an instance in which the legislature decides to override
the court. 119 For some judges, at least, both these possibilities may also be
a source of pressure to defer to dialogic legislative sequels.
By expressly allowing legislatures to override courts by ordinary
majority vote, for some judges, formal override mechanisms may also
provide additional legal support – or authorization – for a decision to defer
to dialogic legislative sequels. On this view, formal override clauses do not
simply provide a mechanism for legislative override. They also provide a
source of explicit textual support for a dialogic model of constitutionalism,
according to which courts have broad freedom to interpret the constitution
in first, but not second, look cases.120
In Canada in particular, there is also some evidence to support the
existence of a connection of this kind.
At SCC level, all four cases in which the SCC has actively deferred
to legislative attempts at dialogue have involved provisions that fall within
the scope of s. 33.121 Darrach, Winko and Hall, for example, were all cases
involving the right to freedom and security of the person (s. 7) and/or the
right to a fair trial (s. 11(d)),122 while JTI-Macdonald involved the
guarantee of freedom of expression in s. 2(a) of the Charter. Both these
sets of rights are within the scope of s. 33. 123 Sauvé II, by contrast, was a
case involving the right to vote under s. 3 of the Charter, which is one of
118

Compare e.g., The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873)
For arguments to this effect in the Canadian context, though with a more critical
valence, see e.g., Kahana, supra note 54 at 256-58.
120
For a normative defense of such a model, see Dixon, Charter Dialogue, supra note
6.
121
Dixon, Charter Dialogue, supra note 6. For an earlier observation to similar effect,
see also Kent Roach, Dialogue or Defiance: Legislative Reversal of Supreme Court
Decisions in Canada and the United States, 4 INT’L J. CONST. L. 347, 368-69 (2006).
122
Section 11(d) of the Charter provides, that any person charged with an offense has
the right “to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public
hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal”
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Section 33 applies to s. 2 and ss. 7-15.
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the few provisions expressly excluded from the scope of s. 33.124
At a lower court level, there has been a similar pattern. For
example, there were 9 cases prior to 2005 in which lower courts struckdown legislation for inconsistency with the Charter and the Canadian
Parliament or a provincial legislature then sought to override part of the
court’s decision; and of these 9, 7 have subsequently met with either de
facto success or actual judicial deference.125 Again, in this context, there has
also been a near to one-to-one connection between the willingness of courts
actively to defer to such legislative attempts at dialogue and the availability
of a formal power of override.
Of the four cases at this level in which courts actively deferred to the
legislature, three involved the right to fair trial in s. 11(d) of the Charter;
and one the guarantee of freedom of expression in s. 2(a).126 By contrast, in
at least one of the two cases in which courts refused to show such
deference, the legislation at issue touched so closely on the right to vote
under s. 3 of the Charter – as well as rights to freedom of expression –that it
would have been questionable whether any use of s. 33 could have been
fully effective in the circumstances.127
B.

A Contingent Connection?

At the same time, it is also important not to overstate the strength of
this potential indirection connection between the availability of a formal
power of legislative override and dialogic forms of deference by courts.
While far from the only explanation for the approach of the SCC in
this area, one important contributor
In Canada, another potentially important contributor to the SCC’s
willingness to engage in dialogue with Parliament, and provincial
legislatures, has been the relatively high rate of turnover on the SCC.
Turnover of this kind is not, by itself, sufficient to explain the pattern of
second look decisions in Canada: there has been sufficient continuity in the
membership of the SCC over the last few decades to mean that, in each
second look case, there was at least one justice who opted to defer to the
constitutional judgments of Parliament at the expense of his or her own
124
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prior reasoning, not simply that of the Court as a whole.128 Turnover,
however, has clearly contributed to the willingness of the SCC overall to
adopt a different position in second, as opposed to first, look cases; and
turnover of this kind is a direct product of Canada’s system of mandatory
judicial retirement.
Another potentially important contributor to the SCC’s approach in
second look cases has been the court’s more general approach to
determining the justifiability of limitations on Charter rights, under s. 1 of
the Charter. The SCC has come, over time, to apply a quite flexible
approach to “proportionality” analysis, which is far more fluid and
contextual than a U.S.-style test of strict (or even intermediate) scrutiny.129
Compared to in the U.S. in particular, this also means that Canadian justices
enjoy much greater scope to defer to legislative constitutional judgments,
while still acting consistently with their own prior precedents.130
Whatever the role played by s. 33 in helping create weak-form
review in Canada, to date, it is also important to note that no
Commonwealth court to date – including the SCC – has expressly endorsed
the idea that they should show greater deference in the shadow of such a
power. Rather, as a formal matter, even courts such as the SCC have tended
to suggest that it will be irrelevant to their approach that legislation
represents an attempt at dialogue over the meaning of provisions covered by
s. 33.131
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Some commentators have even argued that the availability of such
power should be treated by courts as weighing against, rather than in favor,
of a decision in second look cases to defer to ordinary forms of legislative
dialogue. Lorraine Weinrib, for example, has suggested that because s. 33
“frees Canada from the crisis of judicial legitimacy that mars other rightsprotecting systems”, it is unnecessary for courts in Canada to defer to
Parliament and state legislatures in other contexts.132 In certain first look
cases, the SCC itself has also shown some sympathy for this view.133
Even in the shadow of a formal power of override, therefore,
Commonwealth courts could in the future quite easily decide to take a less
deferential approach in second look cases. If they were to do so, there
would also be no guarantee that Commonwealth legislatures would then
increase their actual use of formal powers of override.
Even where the public itself disagrees with a court decision, it will
often be extremely costly for legislators to use a formal power of override,
because doing so often requires them to exaggerate the scope of their
disagreement with courts. As Jeremy Waldron has noted, there are two
potential reasons why legislators may disagree with courts about the
application of particular charter rights.134 One reason is that they believe
that the rights in question have no proper application to a particular
context– i.e. they have “misgivings” about the application of rights.135
Another is that they may disagree with judges about the exact content or
priority to be given to the relevant rights in given context (“rights
disagreements”).136 A legislative power of override, however, necessarily
implies that legislators wish to avoid the application of rights in a particular
context, or have rights misgivings. For legislators to use such a power in
order to express rights disagreement, therefore, they must be willing quite
radically to over-state the breadth of their disagreement with courts.
In many cases, the political costs to such overstatement will also be
far higher than the costs of not responding to public disagreement with a
court. This is also especially true in the relevant Commonwealth countries,
given that, to date, none of these countries has experienced the kind of
constitutional crisis the U.S. experienced during the New Deal, in which the
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Supreme Court consistently refused to uphold the most central aspects of
national legislative policy.137
IV.

CONCLUSION

To be tractable, most forms of constitutional comparison require
some form of simplification in how they treat foreign constitutional
practices. When engaging in comparison, it can also often be useful to
classify foreign constitutional practices in terms of certain broad
constitutional archetypes.
When it comes to “reflective” forms of constitutional comparison in
particular, the value of comparison will often be enhanced by treating
foreign constitutional practices in this kind of broadly archetypal way.138
The clearer the reaction constitutional decision-makers have to foreign
constitutional practices, the more likely it is that processes of comparison
will prompt either a sense of recognition, or form of “aversive” reaction,
that can help clarify domestic constitutional commitments.139 The precise
details of foreign constitutional arrangements will also be largely irrelevant
to the reliability of these insights. Any device that can enhance the clarity of
comparison, therefore, will also tend to enhance, rather than detract, from
the usefulness of comparison itself.
In many contexts, this further suggests that there will be clear
advantages to treating the new Commonwealth constitutional model in
somewhat archetypical terms – i.e. as a model of formally revisable judicial
review. In the U.S. in particular, it seems clear that, to date, such an
approach has in fact helped prompt deeper reflection about what about what
(if anything) in our constitutional tradition justifies the existence of such
formally strong-form judicial review, under Art III.140
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At the same time, not all forms of comparison necessarily have this
same reflective focus. Some forms of comparison may be more empirical in
focus, and directed toward understanding how certain constitutional choices
do, or do not work, in practice.141
In the U.S. to date, the potential benefits to this kind of more
empirically-oriented Commonwealth-U.S. comparison also largely remain
unexplored.
In writing, for example, about the potential to “borrow” from the
new Commonwealth constitutional model, American constitutional scholars
often suggest that quite radical forms of constitutional change would first
need to occur. A good example of this is the suggestion, by Robert Bork,
that the U.S. should borrow the mechanism of formal legislative override
that exists in countries such as Canada and the UK, and either make
“decisions of [U.S.] courts … subject to modification or reversal by
majority vote of the Senate and House of Representatives [or]” or deprive
courts “of the power of constitutional review”.142 Both these changes would
clearly require some of amendment under Art V,143 and therefore also a
fairly radical shift in political circumstances before constitutional
comparison would likely have any practical pay-off.144
This analysis, however, largely overlooks the potential for far more
modest – and realistic – forms of empirically-oriented borrowing from
countries such as Canada. A good example of this involves the potential for
the Supreme Court to borrow certain aspects of the SCC’s approach to
second look cases, as a means of addressing the concern, of some justices,
that a decision to defer to a legislative sequel could be perceived by the
public as simply a decision to “to overrule under fire”.145
Take the SCC’s approach in Darrach. Before deciding to uphold the
relevant rape-shield law, the SCC first considered whether the legislation
was at least minimally reasonable in light of the right to a “fair trial” in s.
11(d) of the Charter. Next, the Court considered the degree to which, in
Commonwealth model could cause Americans to “reopen and complicate… in a healthy
way” existing choices regarding judicial supremacy).
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adopting the relevant sequel, Parliament had responded to its own reasoning
in Seaboyer about when evidence of prior sexual experience will be
irrelevant to the question of guilt. By applying these criteria– of minimal
reasonableness and responsiveness, both in Darrach, and subsequent
second look cases, the SCC thus made it clear to the Canadian public that it
would not simply defer to any and all attempts at legislative override.
If the Supreme Court were to “borrow” this approach from
Canada,146 it too could also provide reassurance to the American public that
deference in second look cases need not lead to outright freedom on the part
of Congress, or state legislatures, to override the Court simply by ordinary
legislative means.
Similar arguments exist for a turn to a more fine-grained,
empirically-oriented comparison in countries such as Australia. In
Australia in recent years, there has been a vigorous debate about whether to
adopt a rights charter at a national level, and specifically whether to borrow
the new Commonwealth model of rights protection at a national level.147
The focus of comparison, however, has also largely been on formal
differences between the new Commonwealth constitutional model and the
U.S. constitutional model, rather than on more fine-grained, contextual
differences between Commonwealth courts and the U.S. Court in their
approach to second look cases. There has been almost no acknowledgement
of the way in which, to date, the weak-form status of judicial review in
Commonwealth countries has depended on non-consideration of, or else
active deference, by courts to dialogic legislative sequels.148
The danger this creates, for proponents of weak-form review in
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Australia, is that in the future the members of the High Court might
conclude that the framers of a national rights charter did not in fact intend
that they should show Canadian-style avoidance, or deference, in second
look cases,149 when in fact, this is exactly what is required in order for
proponents of weak-form review to achieve their aims.150 To avoid the
Court reaching this conclusion, on the other hand, all that would likely be
required is for constitutional decision-makers in Australia to give some
explicit, and favorable, mention of this more informal, empirical aspect to
the new Commonwealth constitutional experience.
In both the U.S. and a broader comparative context, the key aim of
the article, therefore, the key aim of the article is not in fact to criticize
existing scholarship on the new Commonwealth constitutional model, on its
own terms. Rather, it is to encourage scholars working in this area to
reorient their focus toward a new, more empirically– rather than reflective –
oriented Commonwealth-U.S. comparative paradigm.
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